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I. Introduction 
The Ghanaian financial system has gone through a considerable crisis since 
1975—or possibly earlier—and it is not yet clear whether these difficulties are 
over, following reforms that began in 1985. The period saw Ghana recording 
low or negative real growth in the economy generally, and the financial sector 
appears to have accompanied it in this downward trend. Savings did not grow as 
the real value of M2 fell steadily at 10 percent per annum between 1974 and 
1983 and the ability of the financial sector to turn low-yield assets into higher 
yielding ones was severly compromised by a number of factors, including 
repressive government financial policies. By 1987, GDS was only 7.8 percent of 
GDP, although it had been as high as 13.5 percent in 1970. 
Aside from the poor performance of domestic savings in the formation of 
capital for the economy, there is evidence that financial savings, which enhance 
intermediation, are much less important than non-financial savings in Ghana 
(IPC, 1988). Indeed, that study estimated that only about 20 percent of total 
household savings in rural Ghana is in financial assets, while in urban areas the 
proportion would only be slightly higher. In addition to the low ratio of financial 
savings to non-financial savings, it is estimated that (particularly in rural areas) 
financial savings with informal bodies are far greater than those made directly 
with formal institutions. While informal savings constituted as much as 60 
percent of total financial savings in those rural areas, we expect that there would 
be no significant difference between the two proportions in urban areas. 
The term "informal financial sector" is used here to describe participation in 
all commercial saving and lending activity taking place outside of formal or 
established financial institutions. In describing this activity as "informal", we 
are aware of the debate over proper terminology. We describe this activity as 
informal in view of the widespread usage of that term in Ghana for that activity. 
This sector of the economy is definitely neither different from what 
Chandavarkar (1985) calls the "non-institutional financial sector", nor from 
what has been referred to as the "unofficial money market" (IPC, 1988). We 
hesitate to use the expression "unofficial" in view of the connotation of illegality 
it usually holds. 
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The research problem 
Although it is generally suspected that the informal financial sector in many 
African countries may be larger than the formal one (Chipeta and Mkandawire, 
1989; Aryeetey and Hyuha, 1990), accurate estimate of the two sectors have not 
received much attention in the literature. This has sometimes led to the notion 
that only weak links exist between them (Ghatak, 1981). If only weak links exist 
between them, then orthodox monetary policy becomes ineffective as an 
instrument for directing the economy in view of the relatively large size of the 
informal sector. Monetary policy could then become effective either through an 
improvement "in the link between the two money markets or by having a large 
amount of credit supplied (by the central bank) directly or indirectly through 
credit institutions and even through moneylenders" (Wai, 1956). The second 
approach is almost certainly inflationary, and solving the problems that arise out 
of that may be beyond the capabilities of the central banks. This calls for efforts 
to strengthen the links between the two financial markets. 
In striving to bring the formal and informal financial sectors closer, there are 
a number of issues that need to be clarified. These include the following. Why 
do people want to hold their financial assets either in the formal or informal 
sector? What makes both sectors thrive, even if unequally, in a dualistic 
manner? Can one upstage the other, and is it necessary for it to do so? Finally, 
do they, in their present form, have the capacity to help transform the economy 
through a strong financial system? 
Answering these questions requires a study of the effects of this financial 
"dualism" on the entire financial system—for example, the allocative effects, 
dynamic effects and the effects on macro-management through money creation, 
etc. But all this requires a better understanding of how the informal financial 
sector operates, who is involved, and what roles various actors play. Equally 
important is a more realistic picture of its size and the implications of this for the 
whole financial system. 
In Ghana, despite the knowledge of the existence of a significantly large in-
formal financial sector, policy makers have long tended to direct economic 
policy without due consideration to the likely impact informal-sector activity 
will have on the efficacy of policy (IPC, 1988). It is noteworthy, however, that 
gradual official recognition of this sector appears imminent. The fact that some 
government departments/institutions have begun the registration of some 
informal financial operators for tax purposes seems to testify to this recognition. 
What is essential now is a fuller understanding of these operations for purposes 
of developing policy, especially in view of the growing significance of the 
informal market. 
Research objectives and scope 
In view of obvious on-going developments in the informal financial sector, as 
well as its apparent importance for capital formation, this research project, 
which will be in three phases, has as its goal a determination of ways of en-
hancing the role of the informal financial sector in the mobilization of domestic 
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r e s o u r c e s i'or capital formation in Ghana. The first phase, covered i n this report, 
a n a l y s e s the rationale for the existence of an informal financial sector. This is 
a c c o m p a n i e d b y an estimation of the size of the market and a detailed 
description of its operations. 
The second phase, to be undertaken later, will dwell on the relationship be-
tween formal and informal financial sectors, while the third phase considers the 
efficacy of macro-economic policies, bearing in mind the existence of a strong 
informal financial sector. It must be pointed out, however, that the three phases 
will not be carried out in isolation from each other since issues in each phase 
have direct relevance for other phases of the work. 
Thus this first phase has as its objectives: 
1. An improvement in the information base with regard to the size, nature and 
characteristics of non-bank savers, borrowers and lenders. This will be 
clone alongside establishing the rationale for the existence of an informal 
financial market. Here, emphasis will be put on savings behaviour and 
lending patterns at the micro level. 
2. Ascertaining the procedure and channels for informal financial interme-
diation. This will also establish the types of economic activity financed 
from the informal market. These considerations should show the conditions 
uiuler which the sector operates and the links it has with formal institutions. 
3. Describing and analysing credit demand and supply conditions in the in-
formal market. 
Research methodology and presentation 
This empirical study utilized both secondary and primary data on the Ghanaian 
economy and on individual savers to describe savings behaviour and the oppor-
tunities open to potential savers. 
Data from a survey undertaken in three Ghanaian cities were utilized to 
provide empirical support for the argument that the informal sector thrives, 
among other things, on the difficulties of the formal sector. This is not to 
suggest that the informal sector lacks its own driving force. Seibel (1988) and 
Mauri (1987) have already indicated the internal driving force of the sector. 
Thus this survey, carried out by randomly interviewing 1,000 market women 
(600 in Accra, 200 each in Kumasi and Takoradi) operating from permanent 
market stalls, sought wide-ranging information on informal savings and lending 
facilities, as well as the conditions for operating on the market. 
Market women were selected as the focal group for the study (on the savings 
side) for a variety of reasons. The few data available on the informal economy 
suggest that women dominate several areas of that sector, especially in trading 
activities such as the distribution of local foods and small manufactured con-
sumer goods (Hafkin and Bay, 1981). There are large-scale traders among these 
women, but the majority of them can be described as petty traders. Their fi-
nancial dealings often involve frequent transactions in cash. Several of them 
4 RESEARCH PAPER 
also rely on suppliers' credit facilities. The traders are largely illiterate and 
depend on verbal rather than written transactions. The formal banking system is 
not designed to accommodate such customers and the majority of them, 
therefore, have continued their reliance on informal financial systems to sustain 
their trading activities. They are by far the most important group of participants 
on the informal financial scene with regard to saving. 
On the lending side, we also interviewed 12 moneylenders in Accra, Hohoe 
and Agona Swedru (the last two being significant commercial towns). This was 
supplemented by interviews with 17 susu collectors in Accra. These appear to be 
the major informal lenders. 
In addition to the information gathered during our field work, we also used 
material from the study of rural finance systems in Ghana by a German con-
sulting firm, Interdisziplinaere Projekt Consult (IPC, 1988), to supplement our 
urban survey. This provided the present study with an appropriate rural di-
mension. The dependence on the IPC study is due to the lack of other substantial 
sources of information. 
II. Rationale for the existence of an 
informal financial sector in Ghana 
Considering the hypothesis that the proportion of financial savings and lending 
activity that takes place outside of the formal system is no less significant (and 
is probably larger) than that within the system, it would be interesting to know 
how the informal sector manages its affairs in order to stay in business. But why 
should the informal sector not be doing worse than the formal one when 
considerably more effort—at least in terms of policy and capital investments— 
goes into strengthening the latter? A growing formal financial sector is regarded 
as a major indication of growth and development in the whole economy, but the 
evidence from Ghana suggests (as will be seen in Section IV) that for a 
considerable number of years the informal sector grew at the expense of the 
former. Although "informal" forms of financing have been known to pre-date 
banking activity in Ghana (Technoserve, 1988), that type of financing was 
generally expected to lose its significance through an increasing level of mod-
ernization and complexity in the economy. 
In establishing a rationale for the continuing existence of the informal sector 
of the financial market, we shall be arguing that the sector derives its dynamism 
both from developments within the formal sector and also from its own internal 
characteristics. In this regard it is important to note the suggestion by Aryeetey, 
et al. (1990) that various indications of the size of formal financial savings 
showed a declining trend as interest in the informal sector grew between 1976 
and 1984. The declining formal activity occurred at the same time that the j 
number and density of banks increased in Ghana. For example, as bank density j 
increased from 1.9 to 3.2 banks per 100,000 persons between 1976 and 1984, j 
the M2/GDP ratio fell from 29 percent to 12.3 percent. Also, claims by the} 
banking system on the private sector as a percentage of total credit granted by j 
the banking system declined from 13.6 percent to 6.4 percent between 1977 and) 
1982. It will be shown that interest in saving, if not borrowing, within the^;> 
informal sector grew at the time. In view of these initial observations, the focus 
in establishing a rationale for the continuing existence of the informal sector in 
this section is on how developments in the formal sector may contribute to this 
continuing existence. The infomal sector's own dynamism is discussed in 
Sections III, IV, V and VI. A brief observation on possible relationships 
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between the formal and informal financial sectors precedes, however, the 
consideration of how the formal sector contributes to the survival of the 
informal sector. (A detailed analysis of the relationship between the two sectors 
of the financial market will be carried out in the second phase of this on-going 
study). 
The nature and structure of demand facing the formal and 
informal f inancial sectors 
One question that is often posed in discussions of the informal financial sector is 
whether the demand for services from the informal sector competes with 
demand in the formal sector or complements the latter. To answer this question, 
it must be borne in mind that there is a wide variety of actors in the informal 
sector, and this makes it difficult to characterize the nature and structure of 
demand for the entire sector. The structure of informal demand for credit, for 
example, is much more complex than is generally known, and certainly much 
more so than demand in the formal sector. In this regard, it is important to 
establish from the beginning whether a single market exists for all those who 
offer financial products or separate markets can be identified. The existing 
theory on market segmentation is not too helpful in this quest (cf. Stapleton and 
Subrahmanyam, 1977). Without a doubt, the discussion is of a single market that 
is extensively segmented within its informal components, but interacting 
actively in several of the segments. To simplify the analysis, we may consider 
each of the two sectors as a single composite unit and see how they relate to 
each other, first in terms of product differentiation, considering end-use and 
other inherent characteristics, and, second, in terms of the way potential users of 
the facilities view them. 
As already indicated, the formal financial sector, dominated by commercial 
and development banks, has both short-term and long-term credit to offer, aside 
from few other banking facilities that are not extensively utilized by the 
household sector. The fact that over 90 percent of these credit facilities are of a 
short-term nature has been indicated by Aryeetey et al. (1990). The limited 
availability of long-term finance is attributed to the internal management 
problems of these banks. Credit from the formal financial sector is often for the 
financing of working capital and comes mainly through overdraft facilities. 
The informal sector, on the other hand, offers similar long-term and short-
term credit with more emphasis on the short end. This is also usually available 
for working capital and consumption purposes. It must be pointed out, however, 
that it is not always possible to differentiate between borrowing for working 
capital and consumption, as will be seen in this study. Thus, based on the 
product alone, one could argue that the informal (e.g. a large part of the urban 
moneylending business) and formal sectors offer a similar product, which may 
not be entirely homogeneous. (We illustrate the minor differences in our study 
of moneylending in Section V.) On this criterion alone, an oligopolistic 
relationship between the two sectors may be assumed whereby the two products 
substitute for each other. This assumption may be misleading, however. The two 
do not always substitute for each other since some complementary relationships 
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are also observable. This is explained below. 
W h a t c o m e s out from the discussions above is that both the formal and in-
formal financial sectors cater to the needs of easily identifiable groups of in-
dividuals and businesses, while at the same time jointly serving sections of the 
total demand for financial services that could switch either way in a competitive 
relationship or use both sectors concurrently. Thus banks usually satisfy the 
demand of large established firms engaged in specific economic activities, while 
creditors from the informal sector, such as moneylenders, attend to individuals, 
s m a l l - s c a l e commercial activity and the agricultural sector. But participants in 
either sector may cross to the other depending on many factors, including the 
s t r e n g t h of institutional barriers, the availability of credit facilities and the ease 
of physical access. In other words, the total demand for each sector is not 
e x c l u s i v e , as already suggested. This demand that is common to the two sectors 
may be described as "non-specific" (following Hemmer and Mannel, 1989), and 
it is its role that should, in a free and dynamic model, influence relative pricing 
in the two markets. (For a fuller explanation of this process, see Aryeetey and 
Ilyuha. 1990.) 
'The size of this "non-specific" element in the total demand depends on 
whether the services of the informal sector are presented either as a substitute or 
a complement to those of the formal sector. Aryeetey and Hyuha (1990) explain 
this distinction in the financial markets with an illustration based on the 
elementary economic principle that complementarity is reflected in joint de-
mand: 
. . . for the owner of a small processing plant who obtains credit from a commercial 
bank ID expand his plant size and then borrows from friends to pay for new raw 
materials, the two sectors certainly complement each other. On the other hand, if 
tho hank had rejected his application for credit, and he had had to invest in the 
expansion with credit from friends or a moneylender, such credit would be seen as a 
substitute for the unavailable formal credit. This does not mean that one can only 
talk ol substitution when a request is denied. If the potential borrower has doubts 
abom his eligibility on the formal market and therefore goes elsewhere, one can still 
talk of substitution (p. 21) 
It is difficult to attempt to isolate the "substitution" and "complementary" 
element* in the demand for credit in both sectors. It is to be expected, however, 
that the greater the element of "substitution" in the demand (in other words the 
ease with which assets could be switched), the more "non-specific" that demand 
would be. By the same token, the size of complementary demand in the informal 
sector would be directly related to the amount of credit the formal sector is 
willing to supply. We may propose, then, that demand in the formal market, 
which is likely to be mainly urban, would have a greater proportion of "non-
specificity" (and therefore be more elastic) in view of the relative ease with 
which urban dwellers and other users of the sector can switch from one to the 
other. As the evidence in Section III will show, this expected shift from time to 
time is realistic. The mechanism for regulating this shift from one sector to the 
other will be studied in the next phase of this on-going research work in view of 
identified institutional barriers and the relatively small role of interest rates in 
portfolio choice, (cf. Aryeetey et al., 1990). 
8 RESEARCH PAPER 
Elasticity of demand for formal savings and lending facilities 
When a person operates a deposit account with a bank he/she generally expects 
a return on the account, either by way of regular payments of interest or any 
number of other benefits. On the other hand, there are a number of costs that 
must be reckoned with. These determine the structure of the demand curve for 
savings facilities. To empirically ascertain the structure of the aggregate demand 
curve for formal savings facilities, the ideal thing would be to obtain data on the 
number of deposit facilities people would want to open as costs change. This is 
almost impossible to capture accurately in a questionnaire, but various observed 
attitudes to changing costs give acceptable indications of the structure of the 
demand curve. We consider below various factors that influence the demand for 
formal savings and lending facilities and relate these to identified structures of 
demand curves for the formal and informal sectors. 
Transaction costs and the demand for savings facilities in Ghana 
In our survey of 1,000 market women in the three cities of Ghana, it emerged 
that there are usually three major reasons why respondents would not save with 
banks. These were that: 
1. Their incomes were too low—suggesting that they expected only those with 
high incomes to deal with banks; 
2. There was too much formality at banks—related to paper work which led to 
an unnecessarily extended transaction time; 
3. Banks were usually uninterested in small frequent deposits of torn notes and 
discouraged market women from making them. 
The major factor here, as far as these urban women were concerned, was the 
time it took them to complete a deposit transaction. Although only about a third 
of the respondents operate a bank account now, more than half have operated a 
bank account in the past. Many of the respondents explained that the length of 
time that needs to be spent at a bank has been increasing steadily over the 
years—particularly since the government forced the payment of all salaries 
through banks. On a "normal" day, when no salaries are being paid and there-
fore banks are not crowded, a deposit takes an average of 15 minutes, while a 
withdrawal takes between 20 and 30 minutes in a large urban commercial bank. 
At the end of each month, when banks are crowded with salaried workers, an 
average withdrawal at banks in Accra takes one and a quarter hours to complete. 
In the other regional capitals, at least 45 minutes would be required to make a 
withdrawal at the end of the month. These times may be compared to the 
average transaction time of 30 seconds observed susu collectors at the Makola 
Market in Accra. 
Considering the fact that most currency in circulation at the markets is old and 
torn, and often in small denominations, counting at banks is a painful experience 
for bank clerks if large sums are involved. They often ask the women to wait 
until other customers with larger denominations have been served. When only 
small sums are to be saved, bank clerks are seldom encouraging. Some clerks 
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feel that the passbooks are filled up rather too quickly and they do not think the 
e x p e n s e of supplying new passbooks regularly is justified by the small deposits. 
S u b s e q u e n t l y , many market women find bank clerks "unfriendly". 
Travel cost and time do not usually feature prominently in the estimation of 
t r a n s a c t i o n cost by the urban market women since in any of the three cities there 
is a bank within a kilometre radius. The average distance to the nearest bank was 
0.7 km. To show the relative lack of interest in travel time/cost to the urban 
w o m e n , more than 40 percent of those who saved with banks did not operate an 
account with the nearest bank branch. They saved with banks which were, on 
the average, over 4 km away. Thus, the major component in the transaction cost 
is the time spent at the banks and the reception accorded savers by bankers. It is 
generally accepted that opening a bank account in G h a n a is an arduous task, and 
undoubtedly this has helped to reduce the number of new accounts opened in the 
last decade. 
In smaller communities and rural areas, travel time and costs play a more 
important role in transaction cost than in large urban communities. IPC (1988) 
studied 2.414 individual savings accounts held with 37 different rural outlets of 
formal financial institutions and found "strong corroborating evidence con-
cerning the importance of travel time as a determinant of demand for deposit 
facilities". They found that almost 93 percent of the total deposits in the rural 
banks they studied were owned by individuals living within easy walking dis-
tance of the banks. It is therefore highly likely that many of the rural households 
that have refrained from keeping deposits with formal institutions did so after 
reckoning with travel time and cost, though other factors certainly came into 
play. It confirms the fact that the demand for savings facilities is sensitive to 
price. In the study by IPC (1988) it was found that individuals from larger rural 
communities (where banks were very often located) usually had larger deposits 
in the banks than those who lived in smaller communities, and this they 
attributed to the fact that those in large communities could do so at a lower 
average cost. 
A problem caused by the long travel time to banks in rural areas is the fact 
that the liquidity of assets held in banks becomes increasingly doubtful. This is 
because business opportunities that arise unexpectedly and to which people have 
to react as quickly as possible, become endangered through delayed reaction. 
This is especially so in a high-inflation period, with shortages of several items 
and commodities, thus turning all traders into speculators. In situations where 
the use of cheques is not widely accepted, such a development is commonplace. 
Political costs of saving with formal financial institutions 
Much as savers in Ghana recognize the fact that deposits with banks provide the 
best guarantee for security against physical loss, they are also aware of the fact 
that losses could be incurred through the political actions of governments. 
Between 1979 and the end of 1982, different governments in Ghana put in 
place policies that directly undermined public confidence in the banking system. 
These include the following: 
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1. The freezing of all bank deposit accounts exceeding 50,000 cedis in order to 
investigate tax liability and possible corruption or fraud; 
2. The recall of bank loans for the financing of trading inventories; 
3. The compulsory payment by cheque at all transactions exceeding 1,000 cedis 
in value by the government and a strong encouragement of the private sector 
to do likewise. 
Aside from these measures, the sudden withdrawal of 50-cedi bank notes in 
1982 eroded confidence in the holding of currency. Distrust in the banking 
system encouraged the holding of assets in physical forms such as building 
materials that were not going to be used for a long time. 
Following these policy measures and their implementation, many people who 
ordinarily saved or were considering saving with banks thought it no longer 
wise to do so. Holding of bank financial assets became not only unattractive but 
also threatened their personal security. Similarly, forcing low-income people to 
pay for services with cheques had the negative effect of encouraging the habit of 
issuing dud cheques. This development has forced many organizations, 
including public concerns, to reject personal cheques as a means of payment, 
and in turn discourages the holding of bank assets. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the private sector significantly reduced its holdings of financial assets. It is 
estimated that the M2/GDP ratio fell from 20 percent in 1976 to 12 percent in 
1984, thereby raising the velocity of circulation of money from 3.4 to 8.1 
(World Bank, 1987). (See Annex 1.) 
The number of market women in our survey who operated bank accounts fell 
by about 25 percent between 1982 and 1989. For a half of these people loss of 
confidence was the major reason for closing the account. This is not surprising 
given the number of market women and businessmen who had to appear before 
committees of enquiry to explain the sources of their incomes and savings. It is 
not yet clear whether the eroded confidence has been restored following reforms 
introduced into the banking system after 1985. It would be even more difficult 
to ensure renewed confidence in the private sector since no guarantees against 
political interference in the financial system are provided. In this regard, the 
Ghanaian situation is little different from what Venieris and Gupta (1986) found 
for other developing countries. 
Another illustration of the lack of confidence in banks is the fact that while 
the number of people who operated deposit accounts may have been rising, 
albeit at a reduced rate at the time, depositors did not seem equally enthusiastic 
about increasing the sizes of their deposits which would have been a measure of 
the confidence people have in banks. Between 1987 and 1988, the average 
deposit per rural bank in Ghana increased by 13.8 percent, while the number of 
account holders went up by 20.4 percent (Bank of Ghana, 1988). This situation 
is true of most other formal financial assets since 1979. 
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Credit facilities from formal financial institutions 
Banking institutions generally have four types of credit facilities. These are 
o v e r d r a f t facilities (which take the greater part of bank lending), short-term 
loans, medium- and long-term loans, and group loans. 
About 90 percent of the lending to the private sector by the average bank 
b r a n c h is in the form of an overdraft which is usually made to salaried workers, 
big traders and wealthy farmers who operate current accounts or demand 
deposits with the branch. Overdrafts are essentially of a short-term nature 
(usually one month) and interest is calculated on the actual balance. Often this 
facility is not available to small farmers and traders. 
Banks very seldom grant loans exceeding a year's maturity date. Thus all 
small-scale entrepreneurs, farmers, traders, craftsmen, etc, usually have to apply 
for short-term loans. 
Interest on most short-term loans ranges between 23 percent and 32 percent 
per annum, depending on the sectoral allocation and bank practice. Thus, for 
example, loans to the agricultural sector in some banks attract interest of about 
23 percent, loans to the industry and service sectors attract 26-28 percent. In 
addition, however, there are usually a number of fees to be paid, depending on 
how the loan is utilized and serviced, thereby raising the effective interest rate to 
anything between 40 percent and 70 percent. Notable among the numerous 
chargeable fees are the commitment fee on unutilized disbursements and the 
service fee, which is really a penalty for default. Following the estimated high 
effective interest rates, it has been concluded that 
This effective rate of interest does not appear to be particularly high in relation to 
the rates in the informal market. However, there is a difference which has far-
reaching consequences. In the informal market the terms of a contract are always 
very clear and seem to be understood by both sides; in the case of a bank loan, the 
borrowers are told that they are charged, e.g. 25 percent interest plus 5 percent fee, 
while they feel or even know that the loan is much more costly (IPC, 1988). 
It is no wonder, therefore, that demand for credit from formal institutions may 
not be as high as would be expected. One possible way of estimating the 
demand would be to look at records of loan applications but, as we were reliably 
informed by a number of bankers, this would not give us a fair estimate since 
many people who submitted applications to loans officers were advised to 
withdraw their applications when it became obvious to the officer that they did 
not stand much chance of receiving credit. In other words, only a small fraction 
of actual applications are recorded. We tried, however, to find out from our 
market women their attitudes to credit-taking from the formal sector. 
Of the 1,000 market women interviewed, only 14.7 percent had ever taken 
credit from a bank. Of those who had never taken any credit, as many as 95 
percent had never applied for a bank loan, while the other 5 percent had had 
their applications rejected. Many of those who did not apply for loans main-
tained that they did not think they had adequate collateral to support their ap-
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plications (see Section IV). Several more thought they would not receive credit 
because they were unwilling to bribe bank officials. It is interesting, however, 
that over 20 percent of those who had never taken any bank loans thought they 
had never had any need for them. Indeed, it is likely that demand for credit in 
both rural and urban Ghana has been over-estimated, especially in view of the 
fact 95 percent of the respondents believed that incurring debt was a bad thing. 
Table 1 Nominal and real interest rates 
Year Lending rates Deposit rates Discount rates 
(Nominal) (Real) (Nominal) (Real) (Nominal) (Real) 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
197!) 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 ) 
1986 
1987 
. 1,".UY j 
8.10 
8.10 
8.10 
8.30 
8 10 
8 10 
8.70 
8.70 
8 50 
8 50 
8 50 
13.00 
13.00 
10.00 
10 00 
12 50 
12.50 
12.50 
12.50 
19.00 
19.00 
19.00 
19.00 
19.00 
21.17 
21.17 
23.00 
28.50 
2663 
1.85 
2.22 
2.54 
-7.69 
-14.63 
- 6 . 1 1 
18.38 
- 2 . 2 1 
2.05 
5.47 
4.18 
2.19 
-7.07 
-8.75 
- 1 7 32 
-42.91 
-104.02 
-85.59 
-35.52 
-31.15 
-97.50 
-3.31 
-103.85 
-18.43 
10.86 
-1.56 
-11.31 
-5.20 
3.25 
3.25 
3.50 
3.25 
3.25 
3.25 
3.37 
3.37 
3.37 
3.56 
3.62 
8.00 
8.00 
5.50 
5.50 
8.00 
8.00 
8.00 
8.00 
13.00 
13.00 
15.50 
13.20 
9.00 
13.50 
16.50 
18.50 
21.50 
21.50 
^t.00 
-3 .00 
-2.63 
-2.31 
-12.54 
-19.48 
-11.44 
13.05 
-7.34 
-2.89 
0.59 
- 0 . 8 2 
-2.81 
-11.57 
-13.25 
-21.82 
-47.41 
-108.52 
-65.09 
-41.52 
-37.15 
- 1 0 0 . 1 0 
-9.11 
-113.85 
- 2 6 15 
-6.00 
-5 .96 
18.31 
-9.88 
4.50 
4.50 
4.50 
4.50 
4.50 
7.00 
6.00 
5.50 
5.50 
5.50 
8.00 
8.00 
6.00 
6.00 
8.00 
8.00 
8 00 
13 50 
13.50 
13.50 
19.50 
10.50 
14.50 
18.50 
18.50 
20.50 
23.50 
26.00 
-1.75 
-1.38 
- 1 . 0 6 
-11.29 
-18.23 
7.81 
15.68 
-5.21 
-0.90 
2.47 
-0.90 
-2.81 
-11.07 
-12.75 
-21 82 
-47.41 
-108 52 
-59 60 
-41 02 
-36.65 
-97.00 
-11.81 
-108 35 
-21.65 
8 19 
-4.06 
-16.31 
-5.38 
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The granting of credit facilities by banks has been reduced significantly since 
1985. Two instruments have been employed by the central bank to achieve 
e f f i c i e n c y in credit allocation following evidence of high default rates as well as 
i n e f f i c i e n t spreads in deposit and lending rates for different sectors. These are 
credit ceilings and outright prohibitions, and allocational instruments. Most 
b a n k s have utilized the first option which seeks to control and regulate the flow 
of total loans and advances to selected types of economic activity, lending to 
private and public sectors, ceilings on credits to different loan-size classes, and 
ceilings on total lending by individual banks. In applying these, the Bank of 
Ghana directed commercial banks to regard lending to the export trade sector in 
1987/88 as special, for which there should be no limitations to credit expansion. 
Similarly, agriculture, manufacturing, construction, transport, storage and 
communications needed to be regarded as priority sectors for which a maximum 
of 20 percent increase in commercial bank credit was allowed. An outright ban 
was imposed on credit to support import trade. 
l;rom experience, many bankers regard lending to the agricultural and con-
struction sectors as a high-risk venture in view of the relatively high rates of 
default in those sectors. One banker at a market town (Techiman, pop. 22,500) 
disclosed that he expected 70 percent of all loans to the agricultural sector not to 
be repaid. In view of the high default rates experienced by bankers only very 
few can afford to grant new loans. Many bank managers outside Accra admit 
that no new loans have been granted since the beginning of 1989. This is being 
done while they intensify efforts to collect overdue payments. 
Small traders cannot expect to receive credit facilities from the bankers and it 
is no wonder that many seek such facilities from the informal sector. There is a 
greater likelihood of their obtaining credit facilities so long as they have 
maintained good savings records and there are not too many demands on the 
collector. About 65 percent of the market women indicated that they had access 
to credit facilities from their susu collectors. 
III. The relative sizes of the formal 
and informal financial sectors 
An indication of the relative size of the informal financial sector is often 
available only through a process of deduction, beginning with the formal fi-
nancial sector. It is suggested that the ratio of deposit money to money supply, 
M2, and the ratio of the banking system's claims on the private sector to na-
tional income, would give reasonably good indications of the size of the formal 
financial sector (Wai, 1956). 
The first ratio measures banking development of the money market from the 
liability point of view and gives an indication of the strength and size of the 
operational practices and the success of formal financial management. Thus, for 
our purposes, any decline in these ratios over time would suggest a growing 
relative importance of the informal financial sector, both in terms of size and 
influence on the money market. 
As Table 2 shows, between 1977 and 1986, total deposit money averaged 
about 60 percent of total money supply (M2), but this declined steadily 
throughout those years until 1984, suggesting a likely growth in the informal 
financial sectors as non-bank financial activity experienced relative growth. 
Table 2 Ratio of deposit money to money supply, M2 
Year M2 
(C million) 
Total deposit money 
(C million) 
Total deposit money/ 
M2 
1977 3,320 2,176 0.65 
1978 5,572 3,492 0.62 
1979 6,446 4,019 0.62 
1980 8,728 5,300 0.60 
1981 13,634 7,689 0.56 
1982 17,130 10,402 0.60 
1983 24,329 14,292 0.58 
1984 33,836 19,893 0.58 
1985 55,756 34,011 0.61 
1986 84,604 53,364 0.63 
Source: Calculated from figures in the Quarterly Digest of Statistics, Ghana, May 1987 
The ratio of the banking system's claims on the private sector to GNP shows 
a similar trend (see Table 3). After many years of not very significant fluctua-
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tions. this ratio took a distinct downward turn after reaching its all-time peak of 
7.15 percent in 1971. It fell steadily to 1.55 percent in 1983 when the economy 
was at its worst. 
Table 3 Formal financial-sector claims on the private sector as percent of GNP 
Year GNP Primary banks Ratio (C million^ Loans and advances 
1960 946 47.6 5.03 
1961 1,008 64.0 6.30 
1962 1,084 59.9 5.52 
1963 1,190 77.4 6.50 
1964 1,345 75.8 5.63 
1965 1,447 94.7 6.54 
1966 1,504 98.8 6.56 
1967 1,479 60.5 4.09 
1968 1,650 66.6 4.03 
1969 1,941 91.6 4.70 
1970 2,241 126.3 5.63 
1971 2,449 175.3 7.15 
1972 2,775 174.1 6.27 
1973 3,471 187.1 5.39 
1974 4,613 260.1 5.63 
1975 5,241 304.9 5.81 
1976 6,478 391.1 6.03 
1977 11,123 588.7 5.29 
1978 20,938 739.2 3.53 
1979 28,124 799.7 2.84 
1980 42,671 934.9 2.11 
1981 72,294 1,329.7 1.83 
1982 86,225 1,587.3 1.84 
1983 182,392 2,838.4 1.55 
1984 266,918 5,969.6 2.23 
1985 338,414 12,666.0 3.70 
1986 498,797 19,542.5 3.90 
Source: Bank of Ghana, Annual Report, various issues. 
Yet another way of estimating the relative sizes of the two financial sectors, 
i.e. formal and informal, would be to multiply the average deposit size by the 
total number of individuals participating, if that were known. In the absence of 
this figure, the smaller figure of participating market women could give some 
indication. But here also a problem is encountered since savings deposits mo-
bilized by informal bodies find their way into the vaults of banking institutions 
without any documentation on their real origins. 
Despite these problems, an idea of the amount of savings mobilized infor-
mally could be roughly approximated. In the Makola market at Accra, where 
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city officials have registered 7,266 traders, we estimate that there will be at least 
10,000 people selling various wares on each day, except Sundays. Given that 77 
percent of them save with susu collectors and deposit an average of C500 daily, 
C3.85 million will be mobilized each day, and therefore CI 15.5 million in u 
month. Counting the other two similar-sized markets in the capital, as well as at 
least ten other smaller markets in the city, we estimate a minimum savings 
mobilization of C500 million by the single-collector susu system in a month in 
Accra alone. Naturally this does not include what is mobilized through rotating 
savings clubs and mutual assistance groups, etc. This figure may be compared to 
what the formal system achieves in a month. 
In December 1988, total time and savings deposits mobilized by all com-
mercial banks was C2,671 million for the whole country. The figure represents 
the net deposits made in that month alone after withdrawals, thereby not making 
the comparison ideal. This, however, does not reduce by much the significance 
of the comparison since they both indicate the volume of financial assets 
accumulated in either sector of the financial market by the private sector in the 
month, bearing in mind that withdrawal from the informal sector within the 
period is zero since it is not permitted. In view of Accra's control of 23 percent 
of all bank branches, it is not too far-fetched to estimate that a minimum of 
C614.33 million was mobilized for the month in Accra. Thus, in the urban area, 
it is estimated that the formal sector controls only about 55 percent of financial 
savings mobilized in a month. If, however, one took into account the fact that 
some of the savings counted for the formal sector originated from the susu 
collectors, it is clear that the market shares of the two sectors in savings 
mobilization would not be significantly different. (It must be remembered that 
most of the deposits of the susu collectors are placed in current accounts which 
we have excluded from our estimate of financial savings with banks.) 
Does informal saving amount to "genuine" saving? 
In arguing above that there is no difference between the savings market shares 
of the formal and informal financial sectors, we are aware of the need to dis-
tinguish between what may be classified as "genuine" saving and what is not 
"genuine" saving. The saving behaviour of most informal savers is target-ori-
ented—the target not being to accumulate over an indefinite period but to 
regulate the individual investment and consumption capabilities within a limited 
period (cf. Deaton, 1990). 
Unlike Deaton, we attach more importance to accumulation for small in-
vestments than consumption. Most of our market women involved in saving 
with susu collectors have quite distinct savings plans to help in expanding their 
level of activity. To illustrate this point, many market women who operate at 
market places without permanent stalls expect to accumulate enough to pay city 
officials in order to be allocated a permanent stall which would then make it 
easier to attract customers and thereby expand their volume of business. Street 
hawkers selling tins of milk expect to be able to increase the number of tins of 
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milk they can stockpile in order to raise their daily sales and also their incomes. 
Our view is that, in spite of the short period over which funds are accumulated, 
frequent use as working capital and for the expansion of business, permits the 
transformation of savings into investment, albeit by the same person. What is 
lacking is a proper intermediation system. 
IV. Saving in the informal 
financial sector 
We consider here the usual backgrounds of those who save informally, the 
facilities available to them, the cost of utilizing these facilities, the extent of 
patronage, and also the role this facility plays in economic development. 
Informal savers and their backgrounds 
There are a variety of people, from widely varying educational and occupational 
backgrounds, involved in savings in the informal sector. Variations also occur in 
the ages of participants, as children, active workers and retired persons all 
appear interested in the sector's activities. 
These different groups of people choose different types of informal saving?, 
facilities depending on how those facilities are suited to their economic condi-
tions. Thus, for example, while school children who have no regular income 
may be interested in participating in small clubs for rotating savings, market 
women may be largely interested in the susu system in which a collector comes 
daily to them for deposits. 
Primary-school children are known to deposit a full-day's pocket money with 
a chosen member of a susu group at school once a week in order to collect their 
entire savings at the end of the school term. The lump sum is often used to 
finance their end-of-term celebrations or the acquisition of toys or clothes. 
Junior civil servants, teachers and artisans often set up savings clubs at their 
work places in which deposits are paid to members of the club in rotation. Lump 
sums from rotating savings help the savers make large purchases. Miracle et ul. 
(1980) report members of a group of secondary-school teachers in Cape Coast 
using their accumulated funds to purchase refrigerators. 
Fish traders along the coast in Ghana have also been reported to form clubs 
for mutual assistance through which part of their contributions is used to finance 
fish purchases and control fish supply (Lawson and Kwei, 1974). 
Urban traders, however, appear to dominate informal financial savings. These 
traders (mostly women at large markets) tend to go in for the susu operations 
that involve a known collector coming to them daily at their market stalls. 
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As'lie from these active groups, retired persons also form associations for 
mutual assistance and their mobilized funds are used to provide various forms of 
credit (o participants. The Veterans Association of Ghana, made up mainly of 
retired Second World War military personnel, is probably the most notable of 
these. 
To throw more light on who is involved in informal savings, we consider 
brie 11 v some personal details of our 1,000 respondents, 77 percent of whom save 
mainly informally (see Table 4). The ages of these informal savers ranged 
between 18 and 78, with a mean of 37. Most of the women were married (74 
percent) and had been trading for an average of 14 years. Almost 20 percent of 
these women had had no education, while 38 percent had completed middle 
school, and four had completed university. The market women involved in in-
formal savings were married to men with a wide variety of occupations, in-
cluding self-employed manufacturers, senior public servants, junior public 
servants, artisans and farmers. 
Table 4 Characteristics ol susu savers 
1. Averngi; age 37 
2. Average no. of years in business 14 
3. Usual education level Primary school 
4. Usual occupation of husbands Artisan, junior civil servant, senior civil 
servant, businessman 
5. Major source of income Trading 
6. Proportion of savers involved in other 
economic activity 15 percent 
7. Usual source of starting capital Own savings at home; gift/loan from par 
ents and relatives 
ll is quite obvious, then, that participation in informal savings cuts across 
social and economic boundaries. This will come out more clearly when we 
consider the sizes of deposits and incomes of depositors. 
Rural Informal savers 
In rural Ghana, informal savers were equally diverse in their occupational 
backgrounds, as "teachers, policemen, administrative officers and bankers" were 
idemilied (IPC, 1988). The fact that bank officials were involved points to the 
importance of informal savings operations. The people belonging to those 
occupations showed great interest in rotating savings schemes. These can be 
added to the large numbers of farmers and traders involved in other types of 
savings. The farmers showed greater interest in mutual-assistance groups, while 
traders, as with their urban counterparts, usually went in for the single-collector 
susu system. It is believed that the participation of those involved in more 
modern economic activities is a more recent phenomenon. IPC (1988) report 
that "the rotating 'susu' system is obviously still dynamic enough to reach new 
social strata". 
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Urban and rural informal savings facilities 
The types of informal savings facilities available in both rural and urban areas 
are largely the same, with only minor variations. The commonest informal 
savings facilities are: 
(a) Single-collector susu system; 
(b) Rotating susu system; 
(c) Contributions to mutual assistance groups or clubs. 
It is not clear whether credit unions can be classified as informal organiza-
tions considering the relatively high degree of formality in their operations. But 
in view of the fact that their operations fall outside the ambit of the banking 
system, we shall also seek to throw some light on their operations. We consider 
here only the savings mobilization procedures and the benefits/cost of using the 
savings facilities they afford. 
The single-collector susu system 
The single-collector susu system is believed to have begun in Ghana with mi-
grant Nigerian traders (IPC, 1988). It has been described by Miracle et nl. 
(1980) as mobile banking, and the operations are not much different from those 
of the "pygmy banks" of India (Thingalaya, 1978). A summary of the 
characteristic features of the susu system and informal savings is provided in 
Tables 5 and 6. 
Table 5 Some savings characteristics 
1. Proportion of interviewees who save 79.5% 
2. Proportion of interviewees who know income 76.2% 
3. Average approximate weekly earning C9.864 
4. Average proportion of monthly income saved 19.1% 
5. Average proportion of total savings at home 18.2% 
6. Average proportion of total savings at bank 18.3% 
7. Average proportion of total savings with susu 50.1% 
8. Average distance from nearest bank 0.7 km 
9. Average distance from usual bank (if applicable) 4 km 
10. Proportion of bank savers who save with nearest bank 44.2% 
11. Proportion of interviewees operating bank account before 1982 49.1% 
1 2 . Proportion of interviewees operating bank account in 1 9 8 9 36.4% 
13. Usual reason for never saving in bank Income too low 
14. Usual reason for stopping bank savings after 1982 Lack of confidence 
15. Proportion of interviewees who ever borrowed from bank 14.7% 
16. Usual use of credit from bank Expand business 
17. Usual reason for never borrowing from bank Never needed loan; 
No collateral 
18. Proportion of interviewees operating susu savings accounts 77% 
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Table 6 Summary of some characteristics of the single-collector susu system 
1. proportion of susu savers involved with single-collector system 99.3% 
2. proportion of susu savers involved with rotating savings or ROSCAs 0.3% 
3. Usual way of introduction to collector Approached by collector 
4. proportion of susu savers not signing any undertaking before savings 88.3% 
5. proportion of susu savers involved with more than one collector 19.1% 
6. Average daily payment to first collector C472 
7. proportion of savers making daily savings 98.9% 
8. proportion of savers receiving savings back after one month 82.9% 
9. proportion of savers receiving interest on savings 2.3% 
10. Proportion of savers paying service charge to collector 76.9% 
11. Usual payment to collector Day's saving 
12. proportion of savers who think service charge is not a deterrent to saving 98.5% 
13. proportion of savers who can borrow from collector 64.7% 
14. Usual time allowed for repayment of loans 1 - 3 months 
15. proportion of borrowers who pay no interest on loans 63.2% 
16. proportion of savers who have lost money to a defaulting collector 40.3% 
17. Proportion of interviewees who know somebody who lost money 
through a defaulting collector 79.6% 
18. proportion of savers who do not worry about default 75.0% 
19. Usual mode of default Collector ran away 
20. Average no. of years since beginning to save with present collector 2.2 
21. Proportion of savers satisfied with savings facility 87.2% 
22. Proportion of savers satisfied with borrowing facility 78.6% 
23. Proportion of savers who would save with banks if interest rates 
were doubled 75.9% 
24. Proportion of savers saving with large susu agency 31.8% 
In this susu system, a collector (usually male) visits shops, work places, 
market stalls and homes at fixed times each day and collects funds towards a 
savings plan. Following the plan, a saver agrees to deposit a fixed amount de-
termined by himself/herself in consultation with the collector for an agreed 
period of time—usually a month—after which period, his/her deposits are re-
turned less an agreed sum. In a number of cases, the saver, may, in times of 
emergency, demand her money earlier than agreed. 
Despite the fact that the system of rotating savings is older in Ghana, our 
study shows that the single-collector type is much more popular in Ghana as a 
savings facility. This fact is also confirmed by the IPC (1988) study of rural 
households in Ghana. Of the 1,000 market women we interviewed, 764 saved 
with a single-collector only, while another 21 operated both with a rotating 
savings club and a single collector. Only six people saved solely with a rotating 
savings group. 
Almost 20 percent of those saving with single collectors participate in a sec-
ond scheme with a different collector. The market women maintain this helps 
them to save more while not putting "all their eggs in one basket". Naturally this 
is tied in with the question of security for deposits. 
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Our survey revealed that as many as 40.3 percent of the informal savers had 
lost money through a collector defaulting with payments. In spite of this large 
record of losses, 75 percent indicated that they did not worry about their present 
collectors defaulting in payments to them. This seems strange in view of the fact 
that most of the women recognized that there were hardly any safeguards for 
their deposits. It would appear that security for deposits is very weak since about 
80 percent of the women know of at least one person who had lost money 
through default in returning deposits. The usual way of defaulting in payments 
was through the collector absconding with deposits. 
The poor security involved with the single-collector susu savings may be 
related to the way in which potential depositors are introduced to the scheme. 
For most of them (60 percent) first contact with the collector was made when 
they were approached by the collector himself. In a few other cases introduc-
tions were made by friends, relations and other market women. Interestingly, it 
is rare for either party to undertake any contractual obligations. This was so for 
88 percent of the savers whose only formal connection to the collector was the 
card issued to them on which their daily deposits and balances were recorded. 
Daily deposits (made by 99 percent of susu savers) to collectors range be-
tween CI 00 and CI ,000 in urban areas, with a mean of almost C500. In rural 
areas the range is between C10 and C500, with a mean of C100. When savers 
are involved with more than one collector, they usually pay a slightly lower 
amount to the second collector, where average deposits are about C400. In a few 
instances deposits are made weekly. 
Most savers with single collectors have their deposits returned to them after a 
month. A few others receive them after six months or even a year. For most 
savers, the collector retains the equivalent of a day's savings as his charge after 
a month's saving. In quite a number of cases, however, collectors return the 
deposits in full, thus raising the issue of how they are compensated. We presume 
such collectors are compensated with interest they earn on lending to the market 
women and others. For those who pay a charge for saving, they did not think 
this was a deterrent to savings. 
While 98 percent of savers with single collectors receive no interest on their 
deposits, the remainder indicated that they enjoy interest payments on their de-
posits. These were often savers who committed themselves to saving for more 
than six months before a return of their deposits. Such savings usually attracted 
an interest rate of about 5 percent per month. In six cases, interest rates of 
between 10 and 20 percent per month were observed. This situation is certainly 
comparable to the holding of time deposits with banks. 
People who save with informal agencies, especially single-collector susu 
systems, often have diverse reasons for doing so. The fundamental motivation 
for doing so is derived from the lump sum the facility permits them to accu-
mulate at very little cost. Other important reasons may be listed as follows: 
(a) Easy access to the collector who comes regularly; 
(b) The fact that collectors accept small sums, often made up of torn notes 
and coins; 
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(c) Easy access to credit facilities; 
(d) The personalized relationship between saver and banker which makes 
the collector understand her situation when she cannot afford to meet a 
day's payment on a bad day. He will come back another time without 
much fuss. He might even allow her to withdraw her money before the 
end of the month if given adequate notice—may be of one day. 
Over the last few years, a number of savings and credit finance companies 
have been set up by individuals or groups to operate on similar lines to the 
sinsile-collector susu system. This larger level of operation does not, however, 
seem to be as popular with the market women as the original version. Only 
about 31 percent of susu savers are involved with the larger organizations. The 
women appear wary of the large companies in view of difficulties some of them 
have had with the return of deposits. In view of this trend, we consider here 
some of the characteristics of susu collectors. 
Characteristics of Susu collectors 
Two hundred and fifty single susu collectors are registered in Accra and 
Kuma.si. For this study, however, we interviewed 17 in Accra, and noted that 
most of them (12) had another business apart from susu collection. They 
claimed that the two activities were equally important to them. The major reason 
for being involved in the susu business was to make extra income. They had all 
been susu collectors for periods ranging between one and six years. 
For more than 70 percent, their clients are mainly traders at the market. They 
started off with between 15 and 250 clients, with an average of 60 per collector. 
By 1989, the number of clients ranged between 30 and 1,000, with a mean of 
285. They claimed that they often met their clients through their own 
canvassing, and this ties in with the responses of the market women. 
In a number of cases, potential clients insisted on knowing what assets the 
collcclor held before saving with him. Ten of our collectors owned immovable 
property. It appears, however, that the response in fact have much influence on 
the decision whether to save with the collector or not. In most cases the women 
saved with the collector because they had come to know him. In 80 percent of 
cases the collectors lived or worked in the same area as their clients. 
Savings mobilized by the susu collectors ranged between C15,000 and 
C3()(),()00 daily. The mean daily collection was C165,000. This figure cannot be 
used to estimate the size of the informal sector since the number of active 
collectors is not known. 
The views of susu collectors as to why they are patronized by the market 
women are similar to those of the women themselves, i.e. to obtain a lump sum 
within a relatively short period while avoiding delays at banks. 
The rotating savings system 
As mentioned earlier, the rotating savings susu system is more common in the 
non-commercial economic sectors. In both rural and urban areas, the rotating 
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system is patronized by wage-earners on a monthly basis. An example of this 
system is a group of colleagues at a government office placing an agreed amount 
of savings into a pool within a few days of wage or salary payments. The system 
operates completely on the basis of trust. The number of participants usually 
equals the number of months of operation that the group agrees upon. The group 
randomly (probably by casting lots) selects the month in which each individual 
will receive the full lump sum deposited in the pool by the whole group. Once 
all the participants have had their turn, the group has the option of continuing, 
expanding, reducing its size or folding up. Most work-place savings groups have 
12 members operating for one year, and often undertake more savings cycles. 
Although this system is smaller than the single-collector system, more groups 
are being formed daily as new socio-economic groups are becoming interested 
in the formation of savings clubs (IPC, 1988). 
In addition to wage earners, farmers in rural areas have become significant 
contributors to rotating savings groups. They have been noted to: 
. . . use their "handouts" to purchase productive inputs and trading goods. When the 
money is used for such purposes, the prescribed sequence for paying out funds is 
not always maintained; it can be easily changed if one of the members suddenly has 
an opportunity to buy important items which are necessary for his work (IPC, 
1988). 
It is obvious that, as with the single-collector type of susu savings, people 
involved with rotating savings groups or clubs have quite definite economic 
goals. The usage of these facilities is certainly not simply out of habit or tradi-
tion but the result of sound economic considerations. 
The new government requirement that all public employees be paid through 
the banks is likely to affect the practice of rotating savings among such workers. 
Some public servants who used to make deposits to the fund soon after 
collecting their pay packets, now find it cumbersome to withdraw money from 
bank accounts in order to make susu payments. 
Savings with mutual assistance groups 
There are a number of mutual assistance groups in Ghana whose major pre-
occupation is not necessarily the mobilization of savings. When involved in 
savings mobilization, this function only becomes a means for achieving the 
groups' other socio-economic goals. 
Mutual assistance groups may be found in both urban and rural areas of 
Ghana; examples are the Nanemei Akpee (Society of Friends) in Accra and the 
Amasachina groups of northern Ghana which have specific interests in the so-
cio-economic advancement of their members. 
These groups are often made up of people who share some common charac-
teristics such as ethnicity (in large urban areas), occupation, acquaintanceship, 
etc. The payments made to the groups are usually described as dues instead of 
savings deposits in view of the variety of uses these can be put to by the groups 
as against the individual. For example, "the aggregate deposit of a group, or 
MOBILISING DOMESTIC RESOURCES FOR CAPITAL FORMATION IN GHANA 2 5 
some portion of it, may be earmarked to buy something, or finance a project, of 
benefit to the entire group, such as building a school, a road or a bridge" 
(Miracle et al., 1980). 
Following a study of Amasachina groups in rural northern Ghana, three di-
m e n s i o n s o f their activities have been noted; namely 
1 They are business associations by which people try to support one another in 
various business activities through the reduction of operating costs or a 
control of the market against outside interference; 
2. They are social organizations through which people help one another in 
personal emergencies, e.g. in the payment of hospital bills or the finance of 
funerals and weddings; 
3. They are community-development oriented. They participate in the con-
struction and financing of clinics, dams, roads and schools, thus making a 
significant contribution to the general improvement of their local areas (IPC, 
1988). 
The rural groups are open to anyone provided they are acceptable to the ex-
ecutive committee. This implies the vetting of applications to ensure that the 
groups are well organized and efficient. 
People joining Amasachina groups have given the following reasons for their 
interest in the groups: 
• Safe keeping of money; 
• Mutual trust of members; 
• Strong orientation towards community development; 
• Clear leadership structure; 
« Elaborate control mechanisms. 
A number of people regard mutual assistance groups as ensuring greater se-
curity for their money than the single-collector susu system. This is a result of 
the control mechanism inherent in the structures of these groups. 
Credit unions in Ghana 
Credit unions were first introduced into Ghana in 1955 by Roman Catholic 
fathers working in the northern part of the country. The credit union is described 
by the Credit Union Association of Ghana as "a free association of people with a 
common bond who save and lend money to one another through co-operative 
principles of productive and provident purposes". This common bond is 
described as residential, occupational or associational. There are, therefore, 
parish credit unions, community credit unions and work-place credit unions in 
Ghana. 
Credit unions operate under the co-operative law and are guided by a set of 
bye-laws. They are managed and controlled by annually elected committees 
known as Management, Supervisory, Loans/Credit and Education committees. 
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The unions operate what they call a regular savings scheme for members 
which can be likened to the payments made to susu collectors. This can be done 
daily or monthly, depending on the type of union. The unions usually determine 
a minimum savings level that each member should keep. 
Additionally, credit unions operate a deposit account which permits members 
to receive credit from the union. The unions have also sought to involve 
themselves in susu collection from market women. Our study of market women 
in three cities showed, however, that less than 2 percent of the women saved 
with credit unions. 
By 1988, there were almost 300 credit unions in Ghana with a total mem-
bership of almost 70,000. The average size of a union was 230 persons. The 
largest groups are usually the community and parish credit unions which, in the 
Upper West and Upper Regions where the unions are strongest, have an average 
of 560 members. The work-place unions in those regions have an average of 170 
members. 
An interesting fact about the growth of credit unions in Ghana was the sub-
stantial growth in their membership and deposits during the years when the 
banking system had its worst phase, i.e. 1972-1982 (see Table 7). After 1982 
the credit unions appear to have experienced, first, a standstill, and then a rapid 
decline in savings mobilization and membership up to 1986. 
The credit unions' problems have been attributed to bad management which 
led to high loan repayment default rates. Whereas in properly managed unions 
repayment rates ranged between 92 and 100 percent, in many others these rates 
fell well below 50 percent. It is obvious that the savings mobilization capacity of 
credit unions might be well below that of the susu system. 
Table 7 Credit union statistics 
Year 
No. of credit , 
unions Membership 
Savings/ 
deposits Loans Reserves Assets 
1972 251 27,405 1,242,000 809,489 73,459 1,285,662 
1973 373 39,822 3,178,856 2,481,809 84,466 3,291,422 
1974 435 53,756 3,018,689 1,889,006 110,538 2,194,554 
1975 483 54,444 5,040,173 3,581,127 69,432 3,666,380 
1976 356 44,920 4,521,691 4,182,186 200,538 5,197,346 
1977 371 50,657 6,976,315 6,381,137 43,972 8,018,753 
1978 388 56,038 9,567,271 6,877,475 161,072 10,738,156 
1979 258 43,994 6,139,685 4,268,987 238,751 6,189,855 
1980 310 49,103 10,311,304 633,102 85,342 10,464,342 
1981 410 57,000 16,500,000 10,500,000 177,765 16,681,800 
1982 265 52,130 22,146,550 14,315,771 108,432 22,342,385 
1983 265 52,130 22,146,550 14,315,771 108,432 22,342,385 
1984 265 52,130 22,146,550 14,315,771 108,432 22,342,385 
1985 265 55,154 22,113,807 21,684,246 195,835 22,342,385 
1986 154 47,837 1,630,280 1,279,740 384,725 2,338,532 
1987 257 59,790 2,037,850 1,599,675 438,175 2,923,165 
V. Urban and rural informal 
lending facilities 
In this section we describe various lending facilities afforded by the informal 
bodies considered earlier, as well as the operations of moneylenders. 
Lending within the singie-cotiecto,r susu system 
Although most people who save with the susu system look forward to the lump-
sum payment it brings them, easier access to credit than is possible from banks 
is also a major reason for saving with the susu system. For 31 percent of women 
saving with susu collectors, access to credit on flexible terms was the most 
important reason for saving. This may not be a high percentage but, as earlier 
mentioned, as many as 64.7 percent of them indicated they were permitted 
borrowing facilities by their collectors. This figure, however, is not reflected in 
the number of lenders who actually lend. Only 5 of the 17 collectors interviewed 
by us lend to their clients. 
A major characteristic of these loans, however, is the fact that they are usually 
very short term and may or may not carry any interest. Usually such credit must 
be repaid within one to three months. Indeed in 25 percent of the cases, loans 
must be repaid after one month. Also, for most of the respondents who could 
borrow from their collector, no interest was charged for taking a loan. When 
interest was levied, however, rates varied between 5 and 50 percent per month. 
The usual interest rate charges is 13.3 percent per month. 
The following example of how interest payments are made is typical of those 
taking credit with interest. A woman who normally deposits C100 daily and 
accrues C9,000 after three months may be permitted a loan of C4,500 in 
addition to her lump sum of C9,000 at the end of the period. She then begins to 
pay CI20 daily to the collector for the next three months. Half her normal 
deposit (C4,500) comes back to her as returned savings, while the other half and 
an additional CI,800 go to repay the principal and interest. The women have 
very little problem with this arrangement since the 40 percent interest rate over 
three months is paid daily in very small amounts (C20). (This figure compares 
with an average of 30 percent per annum charged by banks.) 
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Susu operators are usually limited in the amount of credit they can give by the 
size of the assets they control since credit creation is limited by the short-term 
nature of the deposits held by them. They are able to lend only after doing 
"quick business" with high turnover rates using the deposits of their customers. 
No wonder quite a number of susu collectors engage in commerce themselves or 
in even more risky business such as financing the clearance of goods by 
importers from ports. In a few cases, adventurous collectors are known to lend 
to non-customers and such loans usually attract much higher interest rates. 
The large new organizations coming into the susu business often attract 
clients with offers of credit facilities after six months of uninterrupted savings. 
They are introducing a new dimension into the susu business with their inno-
vative ideas. 
Lending within the rotating savings susu system 
The issue of lending is often taken for granted in view of the very nature of the 
system. Each time a person saves, or makes his contribution to the pool, another 
is being lent money (except in the case of the last person to collect from the 
pool). 
The first person to collect from the pool of funds at a typical work-place 
rotating savings scheme usually obtains a loan equivalent to 11 months' of 
savings with no interest. Others who follow him (except the last) similarly ob-
tain loans but over increasingly shorter periods. The fact that no interest is paid 
is the characteristic of borrowing from a rotating fund. 
In order to ensure that all members receive interest-free loans, it is usually 
arranged that there will be more cycles of savings in which the order in which 
individuals collect from the pool will change. This ensures that over a long 
period each person can be sure of obtaining interest-free loans quite frequently. 
Borrowing from this system in urban areas is invariably towards the purchase of 
household equipment which cannot be financed directly from monthly incomes, 
while in rural areas agricultural implements are purchased. 
Since the system operates solely on the basis of mutual trust, in situations 
where potential participants are considered not so credit-worthy, their partici-
pation is discouraged. Also an "arrangement used by associations that has a 
bearing on defaults is a provision by which members can contribute less to the 
fund of members they consider to be relatively poor risks" (Miracle et al., 
1989). This makes contributions reciprocal since one pays into the fund for a 
particular member only what one received from that member. 
The operations of private moneylenders 
Here we examine the characteristic features of moneylending in Ghana. The 
analysis is based on information gathered from the following sources: the gov-
ernment's licensing office; both licensed and unlicensed moneylenders; actual 
and prospective borrowers; and friends and associates of moneylenders. As 
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indicated in the introduction, we interviewed 12 moneylenders in Accra, Hohoe 
and Agona Swedru. 
Some background to moneylending in Ghana 
The Moneylenders Ordinance 1951 of Ghana includes under the term 
"moneylender" 
. . . every person whose business is that of moneylending or who carries on or 
advertises or announces himself or holds himself out in any way as carrying on that 
business, whether or not he also possesses or owns property or money derived from 
sources other than the lending of money and whether or not he carries on the 
business as a principal or as an agent. 
The Ordinance further states that, with the exception of some persons, "any 
person who lends a sum of money at interest or who lends a sum of money in 
consideration of a larger sum being repaid shall be presumed to be a 
moneylender". 
Following these definitions, two major categories of moneylenders may be 
found in Ghana: 
(a) Those who are licensed to operate under the Moneylenders Ordinance 
(1951); and 
(b) Those lenders who do business without official authority. 
Licensed moneylenders 
The need for official recognition of moneylenders' activities in Ghana arose in 
the 1930s when the cocoa boom called for some form of agricultural credit. 
Bank finance was virtually non-existent and whatever credit facility was avail-
able depended on the goodwill of relatives and friends (Adjetey, 1978). 
As the need for agricultural credit increased, usurers appeared. Following 
complaints from peasant farmers about the usurious tendencies of some rich 
farmers in the 1930s, the first ordinance on moneylending came out in 1940. 
This Ordinance was soon found to be wanting when the registration exercise 
began, and had to be strengthened in 1951. The regulations and procedures 
governing the licensing of moneylenders relate to application for a certificate 
from a government agent in the district and registration of licence by a licensing 
officer for the district. 
The Moneylenders Ordinance makes it clear that the moneylender's contract 
will not be enforceable unless a written memorandum is made and signed by the 
parties to the contract. The memorandum is expected to contain all the terms of 
contract, and in particular should show: 
(i) The date on which the loan was made; 
(ii) The amount of the principal of the loan; and 
(iii) The rate of interest per annum, and the amount of such interest. 
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Unlicensed moneylenders 
It is almost impossible to estimate the size of this group of lenders in view of the 
illegal nature of the activity. It is, however, expected to be a much larger group 
than those operating legally. It is generally believed that they are numerous and 
scattered all over the country, especially in the farming communities. They are 
mainly rich cocoa farmers and craftsmen who have some surplus cash and the 
willingness to assist other farmers. 
Fish traders (invariably women) are also known to finance the fishing op-
erations of their menfolk on a quite wide scale. "The general rule is that a trader 
who has lent money to a fisherman to buy a canoe is given the boat's shares of 
the catch to sell, and also the net's shares if the fisherman has borrowed to buy a 
net (Vercruijsse, 1984)." 
A government committee on agricultural indebtedness reported in 1958 that 
the moneylender is a valuable social asset to the village farming community and 
that he is held in high regard. He is also approachable and ready to lend at short 
notice. Farmers usually borrow money from moneylenders during the planting 
season to maintain their households until the next harvest. Some, however, seize 
the opportunity to borrow for "non-essential" expenditure such as funerals and 
other social events. 
Some characteristics of moneylending operations 
Personal characteristics 
Of the 12 moneylenders interviewed, 11 were also actively engaged in some 
other economic activity. While two were engaged in real estate—renting out a 
couple of houses—four others were active traders or owned shops; two owned 
taxis and mini-buses, two operated restaurants and one was a farmer. Only three 
regarded moneylending as their major business activity. Before coming into the 
lending business they had either worked on those other activities or in the public 
services for a considerable number of years. 
Moneylenders are often advanced in age. The lenders we met were aged 
between 50 and 75, with an average age of 61. This is probably a result of the 
fact that they have to spend many years accumulating wealth from other ac-
tivities before they can lend out money. For a number of these older persons, 
especially those living in rural areas, moneylending is the only way of ensuring 
that their accumulated wealth does not depreciate. They often live far from the 
nearest bank and are illiterate. Thus, for them, it is more worthwhile to lend 
money to other persons since it is easier to understand this way of investing 
money than it is to understand what happens when one deposits money with 
banks. It is also easier to calculate the return on one's investment. Other 
moneylenders, particularly those in urban areas, engage in the business out of a 
strong profit motive. For these, lending is a way of obtaining extra income. 
Sometimes, they insist, sympathy towards the "less endowed" is a major reason 
for being in the business. The practice of investing one's own accumulated 
savings, however, distinguishes this form of lending from that of susu collectors 
who lend out the savings of others. 
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The clientele is wide ranging, including market women, other traders, both 
senior and junior public servants, self-employed craftsmen as well as big busi-
nessmen. Stranded travellers or other people in dire need also use the services of 
the moneylender. 
In eight out of the 12 cases, the lenders knew much about the backgrounds of 
their potential clients/debtors. This was usually through introduction by previous 
debtors who briefed the lender about the new client. Thus almost all pre-loan 
interaction is verbal and takes place in the presence of the introducing party. The 
discussions often end, after a day or two, in a signed undertaking by the 
borrower. All the lenders interviewed claimed they kept records of transactions, 
and this was invariably in the form of a list of debtors. Two of the moneylenders 
belonged to a rotating savings (susu) club. 
Size of moneylending operations 
Official data on moneylenders in the Greater Accra Region indicate that there 
has been a decline in the number of licensed moneylenders in the region since 
the beginning of the 1980s. In 1972 and 1977 there were 33 and 25, respec-
tively, but since 1982, there have been under 10 (Table 8). (Figures were 
unavailable for other years.) 
Table 8 Number of licensed moneylenders in Accra 
Year 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989* 
Number 10 6 3 5 3 5 4 2 
' As at October 1989. 
Source: Licensing office. 
Officials at the licensing office maintain that the decline is not peculiar to the 
Greater Accra Region but that most parts of the country have experienced 
similar reductions. A number of factors may be responsible for this: 
1. A sizeable number of licensed moneylenders have quit the trade as a result 
of a growing lack of confidence in their borrowers, as incomes generally 
deteriorated. The increasing rate of default has forced a number of 
moneylenders to fold up. Others have shifted their resources to what they 
consider to be more lucrative activities such as trading and transport. 
2. In order to make it difficult for the police to scrutinize their activities, 
especially their interest rates and conditions for lending, most moneylenders 
have refused to obtain licences. The Moneylenders Ordinance permits the 
police to enter the premises of a moneylender for the purpose of examining 
his licence or books. 
3. Most moneylenders have refused to obtain licences in order to escape regis-
tration fees, taxes and licence fees. 
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Even though only two lenders were registered in Accra in October 1989, we 
managed to interview five moneylenders there three months later. This suggests 
that while moneylending is widespread most moneylenders operate illegally. At 
the same time, the number of operators has almost certainly decreased in this 
decade. It is also believed that, especially in rural areas, widespread bush fires in 
1982-1984 destroyed a substantial portion of the real assets of the moneylenders 
forcing them to convert many of their liquid financial assets into real assets. 
Conditions for the granting of credit by moneylenders 
As observed earlier, moneylending is an activity of those with surplus money. 
The ability of the moneylenders to expand the volume of available credit de-
pends on how much they are willing to invest in the moneylending business at 
any one time. This appears to be limited since the returns from moneylending 
are often channelled into other activities, such as real estate development and 
transport, where the returns may be higher. 
The amount lent out may depend first on the relationship between the lender 
and the client, especially the lender's confidence in the latter; secondly, on the 
capacity of the borrower to repay; and finally on the lending capacity of the 
lender. In situations where the lender does not know the borrower well, the 
amount of credit is limited. We found that the lowest amount of credit given by 
our 12 moneylenders in 1989 was C4,000, while the highest was C2 million. 
The average sum lent out to a client was C100,000. At the same time, the 
number of people who borrowed ranged from 5 to 179. The average number of 
clients per lender was 50. 
The moneylenders' charges are known to have developed out of the tradi-
tional share cropping system (Adjetey, 1978). Under this system, also known as 
the abunu or abusa in the established land tenure system, rich land owners 
allocate parcels of their land to squatters or migrants with the condition that one-
third or one-half of the total produce at each harvest will be given to the 
landowner as his charge for the use of the land. With the monetization of the 
economies of the farming communities, these transactions came to be expressed 
in monetary terms. Thus the big farmer will now grant a loan for cultivation or 
for other purposes and demand that one-third or one-half of the principal be 
repaid after every crop harvest until the loan is repaid. Eventually, this practice 
developed into the modern moneylending business in village communities. 
Other traditional systems for repayment that have been identified include the 
mpemanim and awoba systems of interest rates. With the former, the interest 
rate is fixed at 100 percent; the borrower therefore pays twice as much as the 
principal at the end of the specified period. With the awoba system, however, 
the borrower pledges a valuable or some income-generating property to the 
lender against the amount borrowed. In this case the lender has every right to 
use and enjoy all benefits accruing from the property until the amount is repaid. 
When repayment is effected the lender returns the property to the client. Thus 
the proceeds or benefits from the property assume the form of interest on the 
amount lent out. 
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As far as charges are concerned, moneylenders' current practice suggests that 
fixed terms belong to the past. Currently there are hardly any fixed terms and 
conditions for lending since the entire system functions at a very personal level. 
The terms for lending vary from one moneylender to another, and the personal 
standing of the borrower plays a significant role in this regard. Rates often vary 
with debt maturity dates. These maturity periods varied between one and 25 
months, with an average of 5-6 months.. 
Generally, however, two main forms of interest appear to be in vogue. One 
moneylender described these as "short-term" and "long-term" interest rates. 
Essentially, the short-term interest rate is on a monthly basis. Here, the borrower 
pays the principal and the interest one month after contracting the agreement. 
For some of the lenders, the rates levied vary from one customer to the next 
within the range of 20-50 percent. For others, no differential rates are levied 
since they believe it undermines the confidence of potential clients in them. The 
important aspect of this short-term arrangement is that if the borrower is not 
able to honour the repayment on schedule, he is expected at least to pay the 
interest. The rest of the amount is then considered as new credit, and therefore to 
attract another interest rate at the end of the next month. This arrangement may 
continue for some time until the borrower pays both the principal and interest. 
On the other hand, the long-term interest rate covers several months and may 
run into a year. In this case, the principal and interest are lumped together and 
paid in instalments over a period of time agreed upon by the two parties.. 
In 10 out of the 12 cases studied the lender demanded some form of security, 
and this was usually in the form of a written undertaking. In a number of cases, 
however, land and other physical assets such as jewellery, sewing machines, etc, 
were requested by the lender as in the traditional awoba system. 
Moneylenders have been much criticised for excessively high interest rates. 
Four components of interest rates may be easily identified in moneylending. 
These are, the risk-free element in the rate of interest (that is, the opportunity 
cost of funds), a premium for risk, a premium to cover transaction cost, and an 
element of monopoly profit. What most observers find unacceptable is this 
element of monopoly profit. It is also likely that moneylenders overestimate the 
risk element in giving credit, and therefore charge an unfairly high risk 
premium. 
Another explanation often advanced for high interest rates is that the bor-
rowers are poorly informed about the market. They may not know about al-
ternative sources of finance, whether formal or informal, which may be cheaper. 
Apart from these is the fact that there is a general scarcity of capital as well as 
an increasing default rate among borrowers. Despite the relatively high rates of 
interest, the popularity of moneylending in Ghana is strongly supportive of the 
argument that the cost of credit is determined mainly by supply conditions, even 
though demand may still be significant. 
Other characteristics of moneylending operations 
The relationship between banks and moneylenders 
Eleven of the moneylenders contacted had some business with banks. Of these, 
eight saved with banks and had actually borrowed money from them before. 
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